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Modes of Presentation: Perceptual vs Deferential*  
FRANCOIS RECANATI 
 
 
 
1 Preliminaries 
 
 
1.1. Two dimensions of content 
 
The content of a representation (be it a concept, a thought, a word, or an utterance) is 
what it is a representation of. The content of my concept of tiger is the species tiger, the 
content of my concept of Cicero is Cicero. Similarly, I will assume that the content of 
my thought, or statement, that Cicero is a famous Roman orator is the state of affairs 
consisting of Cicero and the property of being a famous Roman orator. 
 But there is a complication. Suppose I heard of Tully in highschool, without 
ever realizing that Tully is Cicero. I believe that there are two persons, Cicero and 
Tully, who both were Roman orators. Consider my belief that Cicero was a Roman 
orator and my belief that Tully was a Roman orator. Do they have the same content? 
Yes, if the content of a representation is what it is a representation of. For (i) the only 
difference between the two beliefs is the fact that the concept of Cicero occurs in one 
while the concept of Tully occurs in the other, and (ii) both concepts are concepts of the 
same individual. 
 The problem with this answer is that there is another notion of content which 
seems equally legitimate. Arguably, two beliefs have different contents if their input-
output connections are different. Suppose I believe that Cicero did, while Tully did not, 
denounce Catiline. Then, my belief that Cicero was a Roman orator will prompt the 
                                                 
* An ancestor of this paper, corresponding to the first two parts, was presented at the 
Languages of the Brain conference organized in Paris in March 1998 by the 
Mind/Brain/Behavior Interfaculty Initiative (Harvard University) and the Ipsen 
Foundation. It will be included in the Proceedings of that conference, to be published 
by Harvard University Press. The present paper, which I read at the Bonn conference, 
overlaps also with my 'Deferential Concepts: A Response to Woodfield' (Mind and 
Language  vol. 15 n°4, September 2000). I am indebted to Steven Davis for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft, and to ACI Cognitique for funding the last stage of this 
research. 
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inference that a Roman orator denounced Catiline; not so with my belief that Tully was 
a Roman orator. This difference in inferential potential shows that the two beliefs 
somehow differ in content. 
 In the familiar terminology derived from Frege (1892), we can say that there are 
two dimensions of content: what is represented (the reference) and how it is represented 
(the 'mode of presentation'). In the Cicero/Tully case, the reference is the same, but the 
modes of presentation are different. The reference is what is relevant for evaluating a 
representation as correct or incorrect. In contrast, the mode of presentation — the way 
the reference is thought of — is relevant for explaining (and predicting) behaviour, 
including linguistic and mental behaviour. 
 
 
1.2. Modes of Presentation as Mental Files 
 
What are modes of presentation? How are they individuated? If concepts are construed 
as mental files, as I think they should be, it will be tempting to equate the mode of 
presentation with the information (or perhaps misinformation) contained in the file. 
Thus my Cicero-file and my Tully-file refer to the same individual, but contain 
different pieces of (mis)information concerning that individual: in contrast to my Tully-
file, my Cicero-file contains something to the effect that he (the individual in question) 
denounced Catiline. 
 But this qualitative construal of modes of presentation is not ultimately 
satisfactory. The criterion for distinctness of modes of presentation, as stated by 
Stephen Schiffer after Frege, is: 
 
(Frege's Constraint) 
If it is possible for a rational subject S to believe at the same time of a given 
object a both that it is F and that it is not F, then there are two distinct modes of 
presentation of a, m and m', such that S believes of a under m that it is F and 
under m' that it is not F. 
 
Now for it to be possible to believe without irrationality that a is F and that it is not F, it 
is sufficient to have two distinct mental files for a, even if the two files contain the 
same information (e.g. that a was a Roman orator). It follows that modes of 
presentation are not to be identified with the informational content of the mental file, 
but rather with the mental file itself. 
 
 
1.3. Egocentric files 
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One important type of case, much discussed in the recent literature on modes of 
presentation (e.g. Perry 1993), concerns indexical concepts like here, now, this man, 
myself, etc. What is it to think of an object under such a mode of presentation? What is 
it to think of myself as myself, and not, say, as François Récanati? What is it to think of 
a place as here? To think of a pen as this pen? Answer: these modes of presentation are 
'egocentric files', that is, special files which serve as repository for information gained 
in a certain way — typically through perception. The 'self' file serves as repository for 
information gained in the first-person way (e.g. through proprioception); the 'here' file 
serves as repository for information gained about a place by virtue of occupying that 
place and being in a position to perceive what is going on there. Demonstrative files 
('that man') also depend upon perception. In order to entertain a thought in which one of 
these modes of presentation occurs, one must be suitably related to the reference: one 
must be related to it so as to be able to gain information from it in the proper way.1 
 
 
1.4. Types and Tokens 
 
The relational constraint I have just mentioned is a constraint on the context in which a 
certain type of mode of presentation can occur. This suggests the following, overall 
picture. There are mental symbols (types) which are very much like the words 'I', 'here', 
etc. They can be appropriately tokened only in a context which satisfies certain 
constraints (having to do with the subject's sensitivity to perceptual information from 
the object). When the constraints are satisfied, a reference is determined, and the 
symbol (token) counts as a genuine mode of presentation, that is, a mode of 
presentation of something. The symbols have therefore two sets of semantic properties: 
qua tokens (if the context is appropriate) they have a reference which they present in a 
certain way. Qua types, however, they have a 'character', a constant meaning which 
corresponds to the constraint itself and determines the way in which the reference, if 
any, is presented. That constant meaning can be described as a function from 
                                                 
1 Of course one can have an I-thought (or an here-thought, or a this-thought) in the 
absence of any perception. (See Anscombe 1975: 58 for a description of such cases.) 
This shows that the relevant perceptual relation must be thought of in dispositional 
terms: thus understood, "the informational connection still obtains even if the subject's 
senses are not operating" (Evans 1982: 161n). For more on this issue, see Recanati 
1993: 120-2. 
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(appropriate) contexts to the referential contents assumed by the symbols in those 
contexts.2 
 
 
2 Deference and Indexicality 
 
 
 
2.1. Perception and Communication 
 
All the ways of gaining information associated with egocentric files are perceptual 
ways of gaining information. But perception is not the only mode of acquisition of 
information: Communication is another. So the question I want to raise in this paper is 
this: Are there modes of presentation which depend on communication in the same way 
in which egocentric files depend on perception? My own answer to that question will be 
'yes'. But many theorists would rather make a negative answer, and I will start by 
presenting an argument they might offer in support of their view. 
 The argument I have in mind goes roughly like this. There is an asymmetry 
between perception and communication. The latter is parasitic on the former, in the 
sense that whatever information is transmitted through communication must ultimately 
have been acquired through perception. The thought which occurs at the beginning of 
the communicational chain must therefore contain perception-based modes of 
presentation. What happens at the other end of the communicational chain? The 
recipient of the communicational act does not acquire the relevant information through 
perception.3 Yet, arguably, he or she must be able to grasp the information thus 
transmitted, and that means that the information in question must be information she 
might have acquired through perception (even if, as a matter of fact, she acquired it 
through communication). In other words, the conceptual repertoire which 
communication exploits must be the same repertoire which we put to use in perception. 
This supports the claim that there are no modes of presentation which depend on 
communication in the same way in which egocentric files depend on perception. 
 As against this view I will suggest that there is a special, communication-based 
mode of presentation which plays quite a central role in our mental lives precisely 
                                                 
2 In what follows I will use 'content' always in the sense of 'referential content' (as 
opposed to 'character'). 
3 Or at least, not directly. Hearing something on the radio, or from someone, certainly 
involves auditory perception, but what is perceived in such a case is the utterance which 
conveys the piece of information, rather than the fact stated by the utterance. To hear 
that John is presently in Paris is not to perceive that he is, but to be told that he is. 
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because it enables us to go beyond our private conceptual repertoire. I will therefore 
reject the claim that the same conceptual repertoire is put to use in perception and 
communication.4 But first, I want to spell out a consequence of the view I am going to 
oppose. 
 
 
2.2. Deference as Metarepresentation 
 
A woman goes to the doctor who tells her that she has arthritis. She believes what the 
doctor tells her. A number of representations are involved in this simple exchange. The 
doctor, after clinical examination, comes to entertain the thought: 'She has arthritis'. He 
expresses that thought by telling her: 'You have arthritis'. The woman then comes to 
believe something that might be expressed by the sentence: 'I have arthritis'. 
 It seems, at this stage, that the woman has acquired the belief that she has 
arthritis. But suppose, as Burge did in the famous article in which this example was 
introduced, that the woman has only a very vague, possibly mistaken notion of what 
arthritis is. Let us go even further: Suppose she has no idea what arthritis is — she lacks 
the concept altogether. Does she really come to believe that she has arthritis? Does she 
not, rather, come to believe that she has some ailment called 'arthritis'? This view 
seems more in line with the notion that whatever is actually communicated must be 
within the addresse's ken and could not exceed his or her conceptual repertoire. 
 On the suggested view, then, it is misleading to say that the woman comes to 
believe that she has arthritis as a result of the doctor's utterance. She does not actually 
believe that. Even if she goes about repeating 'I have arthritis', and that sentence 
expresses the proposition that she has arthritis, still that is not what she believes. What 
she believes would be more faithfully expressed by a metalinguistic sentence: 'I have an 
ailment called (by the doctor) arthritis' (Donnellan 1993). It follows that there is a 
divergence between the content of the utterance, which depends on social factors (viz. 
the conventions in force in the public language), and the content of the underlying 
mental representation. The mental representation is metalinguistic while the public 
representation is not. 
 
 
2.3.  Another Approach to Deference 
 
In contrast to that metalinguistic approach, the view I am going to put forward does not 
rest on a distinction between the content of the public utterance and the content of the 
underlying mental representation. On my view, one and the same proposition, namely 
                                                 
4 An explicit rejection of that claim can be found in Sperber 1997. 
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the proposition that the woman has arthritis, is both the content of the woman's 
utterance and the content of her belief. (It is also, of course, the content of the doctor's 
utterance and the content of the doctor's belief.) 
 At this point a difficulty immediately arises. How could the woman believe she 
has arthritis? In order to believe that she has arthritis, she must entertain a mental 
representation whose content is the proposition that she has arthritis. Now such a 
representation must contain a constituent (a concept) whose content is arthritis, and we 
have granted that the woman does not possess the concept of arthritis! 
 That difficulty is not as dramatic as it seems. It is true that, if the woman is to 
believe that she has arthritis, she must entertain a mental representation whose content 
is the proposition that she has arthritis. It is true also that such a representation must 
contain a concept whose content is arthritis. But 'a concept whose content is arthritis' is 
a concept of arthritis, it is not the concept of arthritis — that concept which the woman 
lacks. When we say that the woman 'does not possess the concept of arthritis', we are 
not talking of any old concept whose content is arthritis: we are referring to a specific 
concept endowed not only with a certain reference (arthritis) but also with a certain 
character. The woman does not possess that concept, but she possesses another concept 
of arthritis. The concept of arthritis she possesses is a deferential concept, i.e. the sort 
of concept which people who use a public word without fully understanding it typically 
entertain. The difference between the woman's belief and the doctor's (or between the 
woman's belief and her utterance) is therefore not a difference at the content level but a 
difference in character or mode of presentation. 
 
 
2.4. The Deferential Operator 
 
Qua types, indexical symbols have a character, a constant meaning which determines 
both their reference (in context) and the way the reference is presented. That constant 
meaning is a function from contexts to contents. My hypothesis is that there is, in the 
mental repertoire, a 'deferential operator' which enables us to construct deferential 
concepts with a semantics analogous to that of indexical concepts (Recanati 1997). 
 The deferential operator Rx() applies to (the mental representation of) a public 
symbol  and yields a syntactically complex representation Rx() — a deferential 
concept — which has both a character and a content. The character of Rx() takes us 
from a context in which reference is made to a competent user x of , to a certain 
content, namely the content which  has for x, given the character which x attaches to  
. What is special with the deferential concept  Rx() is that its content is determined 
'deferentially', via the content which another cognitive agent, somehow given in the 
context, attaches or would attach to  in the context of utterance. 
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 The deferential operator is the mental equivalent of quotation marks in written 
speech. It is metalinguistic in the sense that it involves a mention of the symbol  and a 
tacit reference to its use by the cognitive agent x (which can be a community as well as 
an individual). But that metalinguistic aspect is located in the character of the 
deferential concept: the content of that concept is the same as the content of the symbol 
 when used by x. 
 Take our 'arthritis' case. When the woman who does not know what arthritis is 
says 'I have arthritis', she does not entertain 'the' concept of arthritis, as the doctor does 
when he tells her 'you have arthritis'. They entertain different mental representations, 
involving different concepts. In the woman's belief a deferential concept occurs, 
namely: Rdoctor(arthritis). But the content of that concept is the same as the content of 
the doctor's concept of arthritis — indeed the woman's deferential concept is parasitic 
on the doctor's concept and automatically inherits its referential content, by virtue of the 
mechanics of the deferential operator. That referential content — arthritis — is thought 
of metalinguistically as 'what the doctor calls arthritis', but the woman's thought is 
fundamentally about arthritis, not about the word 'arthritis'. If I am right, the difference 
between the doctor's concept of arthritis and the woman's is similar to that between 'I' 
and 'you' in their respective utterances 'You have arthritis' and 'I have arthritis': 'I' and 
'you' refer to the woman under different modes of presentation. Similarly, the doctor's 
concept of arthritis and the woman's deferential concept Rdoctor(arthritis) both refer to 
arthritis, under different modes of presentation. 
 
2.5. Deference as Social Indexicality 
 
On the view I have sketched, deferential concepts are like indexical concepts, but 
instead of depending on perception they depend on communication. An indexical type 
of mode of presentation constrains the context of its tokenings: it demands that the 
subject who entertains the mode of presentation be directly related to the reference so as 
to be able to gain information from it in perception. Similarly there is a deferential type 
of mode of presentation which demands that the subject who entertains a mode of 
presentation of that type (a deferential concept) be indirectly related to the reference, 
via a chain of informants, so as to be able to gain information from it in 
communication. 
 
 
3 Using Public Words in Thought 
 
3.1. Self-Conscious Deference vs Imperfect Mastery 
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Andrew Woodfield has put forward the following criticism of my view (Woodfield 
2000). He accepts that there is a deferential operator which works in more or less the 
way I describe, but not my claim that it is at work in examples like the 'arthritis' 
example. The cases that support my view, according to Woodfield, are the cases in 
which we consciously use a word which we do not understand, in quotation marks as it 
were. In contrast to Donnellan, who holds that in such cases what is believed is a 
metalinguistic proposition, I hold that the content of the thought or utterance is the 
same as it would be if no quotation marks occurred and no deference took place: The 
metalinguistic component is located at the character level. Woodfield accepts all this. 
But my theory explains "a rather specialized range of phenomena", he holds. It was a 
mistake on my part to extend it to cases of imperfect mastery, like Burge's 'arthritis' 
example. Woodfield thus rejects my claim that "children, language-learners, and other 
imperfect understanders of picked up words normally bind such words inside 
deferential operators" (Woodfield 2000: 445). 
 Not only is there a phenomenological difference between self-conscious 
deference and imperfect mastery; there is, Woodfield points out, a good theoretical 
reason for not putting them in the same basket. Imperfect mastery is a matter of degree 
— one's mastery of a concept is more or less imperfect. In my original article on the 
topic, I myself insisted that deferentiality is a matter of degree: there is, I said, a 
continuum of cases between the deferential use of a symbol which we do not 
understand and its normal use, between full mastery of a concept and total lack of that 
concept. In between we find instances of partial mastery — as in Burge's original 
example. Now this raises a problem for my account, Woodfield says, because 
 
It seems impossible that there could be a gradual process of moving out of quasi-
quotes. It's clearly not a process of bit-by-bit removal (like taking one's clothes 
off), nor it is a process of decay (like quotation-marks fading away on a page as 
the ink loses its colour). The learner starts off using mental symbols like Rx 
('synecdoches') and Rx ('kachna') and ends up using completely distinct symbols 
like synecdoches and duck.5 Prima facie, there has to be a saltation — a switch of 
symbol-type — at some point. (Woodfield 2000: 447). 
 
I grant Woodfield both points: first, that there is a difference between self-conscious 
deference and imperfect mastery; second, that the gradual nature of imperfect mastery 
makes it hard, if not impossible, to account for the transition from imperfect to full 
                                                 
5 One of Woodfield's examples involves a non-Czech speaker looking at a menu 
written in Czech and uttering For lunch I shall have 'kachna'. 'Kachna' means duck in 
Czech, Woodfield tells us. 
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mastery in terms of a switch of symbol-type. The problem for my account is that such a 
switch is precisely what adding or removing the deferential operator brings about. 
 
 
3.2. Deference By Default 
 
Faced with those difficulties, we may allow for the following possibility. Whenever we 
mentally entertain a sentence containing a symbol we do not properly understand, the 
deferential mechanism operates as if we had used the deferential operator, that is, as if 
we had put that symbol within quotation marks and deferred to some authority for its 
interpretation. But we don't have to actually use the deferential operator — the 
deferential interpretation can be provided by default, simply because no direct 
interpretation for the symbol is available to the subject. On this account the difference 
between conscious deference and incomplete mastery is syntactic, not semantic. In 
ordinary cases of incomplete mastery, the deferential shift takes place without being 
syntactically articulated. Since that is so the continuum from incomplete to complete 
mastery no longer raises a problem. No saltation needs to be involved because the 
difference between normal and deferential use no longer lies at the level of the symbol-
type. One and the same symbol-type is tokened in both cases. If that symbol is 
appropriately connected to some concept in the subject's repertoire, it expresses that 
concept and conveys its content. If the symbol is not appropriately connected to some 
concept in the subject's repertoire, the concept that is expressed is that which would be 
expressed by applying the deferential operator to that symbol. On this account, it is only 
to be expected that the process of connecting up a symbol with concepts in one's 
repertoire, hence the transition from deference to full mastery, will be gradual. 
 
 
3.3. The Interpretation Principle 
 
Though it is a step in the right direction, the foregoing account is not ultimately 
satisfactory, for it violates a principle which I put forward in my original paper, and 
which we can call the Interpretation Principle: 
 
It is hard to think of a symbol being mentally entertained without being 
'interpreted' in some fashion or other... If a mental sentence is well-formed, it 
must possess a definite meaning — a character — even if it falls short of 
expressing a definite content. (Recanati 1997: 91, quoted in Woodfield 2000: 
444) 
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If we accept this principle, as I do, then there is an incoherence in the revised account 
presented in the last section. We are to suppose that the subject entertains a mental 
sentence in which a symbol  occurs. Whenever that symbol turns out to be 
uninterpreted by the subject's own lights, it receives a deferential interpretation by 
default. This violates the Interpretation Principle: for the so-called mental sentence will 
not be well-formed in the first place — it will not be a mental sentence — if it contains 
some uninterpreted symbol. Mental sentences must be constituted out of the right 
material — conceptual material. The symbols used in thought must be potential 
conveyors of content: they must be interpreted at least at the character level. That is 
what the Interpretation Principle requires. The role of the deferential operator was 
precisely to guarantee satisfaction of the Interpretation Principle. In the same way in 
which quotation marks can turn a non-word into a well-formed expression of English, 
the deferential operator can turn the uninterpreted symbol  into a complex symbol 
Rx(), which has a character and possibly a content. 
 On the revised account, the uninterpreted symbol  will acquire a character 
when the deferential interpretation is provided by default. But this is too late: how will 
the uninterpreted symbol  come to occur as a constituent in the subject's thought, 
unless it is already interpreted? This is a serious worry for anyone who accepts the 
Interpretation Principle. 
 
 
3.4. Words as Concepts 
 
I suggest that we revise the revised account so as to satisfy the Interpretation Principle. 
Let us not say that the deferential interpretation is provided by default when an 
uninterpreted symbol occurs in thought. According to the Interpretation Principle, no 
uninterpreted symbol ever occurs in thought. Still, we want to capture the fact that 
sometimes, in our thinking, we use a public word which we do not understand. In line 
with the Interpretation Principle, we want the word in question to receive a deferential 
interpretation from the very start; and we do not want this interpretation to affect the 
identity of the symbol-type, as the use of the deferential operator would do. These are 
the desiderata. 
 I suggest the following account as a means of satisfying the desiderata. We must 
give up the Aristotelian view that words are labels associated with concepts. We must 
construe words themselves as concepts,6 which we can associate with other concepts 
                                                 
6  I am not suggesting that we should identify concepts with words. Obviously, there 
are many concepts to which no word corresponds. My point, rather, is that a sub-class 
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(e.g. recognitional concepts). Thus, when we acquire a public word, whose use we do 
not yet fully master, we automatically acquire a concept.7 The concept in question is 
deferential: its content is determined via the users whom we get the word from (or via 
the community in general). When we use a word we do not understand in our thinking, 
it is the deferential concept which occurs in our thought — hence the Interpretation 
Principle is satisfied. Again, the public word, insofar as we use it in thought, is the 
deferential concept, it does not have to be associated with a deferential or any other 
type of concept. In this account there no longer is a gap between the public word which 
                                                                                                                                              
of our concepts is constituted by public words which we imperfectly understand but 
which we are able to use in our thinking. 
7 See Millikan 1998, §6: 
It is... possible, indeed it is common, to have a substance concept entirely through 
the medium of language, that is, in the absence of any ability to recognize the 
substance in the flesh. For most of us, that is how we have a concept of Aristotle, 
of molybdenum, and, say, of African dormice. There, I just handed you a concept 
of African dormice, in case you had none before. Now you can think of them at 
night if you want to, wondering what they are like — on the assumption, of 
course, that you gathered from their name what sorts of questions you might 
reasonably ask about them... In many cases there is not much more to having a 
substance concept than having a word. To have a word is to have a handle on 
tracking a substance via manifestations of it produced in a particular languge 
community. Simply grasping the phonemic structure of a language and the 
rudiments of how to parse it enables one to help oneself to an embryo concept of 
every substance named in that language. 
Similar remarks can be found in Kaplan's 'Afterthoughts': 
The notion that a referent can be carried by a name from early past to present 
suggests that the language itself carries meaning, and thus that we can acquire 
meanings through the instrument of language. This... provides the opportunity for 
an instrumental use of language to broaden the realm of what can be expressed 
and to broaden the horizons of thought itself. (...) Contrary to Russell, I think we 
succeed in thinking about things in the world not only through the mental residue 
of that which we ourselves experience, but also vicariously, through the symbolic 
resources that come to us through our language. It is the latter — vocabulary 
power — that gives us our apprehensive advantage over the nonlinguistic 
animals. My dog, being color-blind, cannot entertain the thought that I am 
wearing a red shirt. But my color-blind colleague can entertain even the thought 
that Aristotle wore a red shirt. (Kaplan 1989: 604) 
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occurs in thought and the deferential interpretation it receives: the deferential 
interpretation is a built-in feature of public words qua thought constituents. 
 What happens when (gradually) we come to understand the word in a non-
deferential manner — when, for example, we get acquainted with what it applies to? 
We must not think of this process as the association of the word with a concept — an 
association which was lacking beforehand. Rather it is the association of two concepts: 
a deferential concept and another type of concept. This is the same sort of process 
which takes place when we recognize an object we have seen before: then a past-
oriented demonstrative concept 'that object [which I saw the other day]' gets associated 
with a standard demonstrative concept based on current perception: 'that object [in front 
of me]'.8 In such a re-identification situation typically the two concepts coalesce, are 
merged into a single recognitional concept, with a distinct character. (That arguably is a 
third concept, distinct from the first two as a child is from mother and father.) 
Similarly, when a deferential concept — for example, Putnam's concept of an elm — 
gets associated with a non-deferential concept (e.g. the demonstrative concept 'that type 
of tree'), and that association stabilizes, a new concept results, with a distinct character. 
How is the merging process to be properly described? I don't know, but I have no doubt 
that the merging process can be gradual, and that is all that matters for us. 
 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
What is left of my original account? From a strictly semantic point of view, there is no 
significant difference between the original account and the account we arrive at. When 
in our thinking we use public words which we do not quite understand, our thoughts 
have deferential concepts as constituents. The character of these concepts is the same as 
the character of complex symbols built up with the help of the deferential operator. The 
character in question is metalinguistic, much as the character of indexicals is 
metalinguistic. Just as 'I' refers to the person who says 'I', 'arthritis', for the patient, 
refers to what the doctor calls 'arthritis'. But the content of the thought or utterance is 
metalinguistic in neither case: when she thinks 'I have arthritis', the patient entertains a 
thought which is about her (not about the word 'I') and about arthritis (not about the 
word 'arthritis'). 
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